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Then does segregation offend against equality? Equality, like all
general concepts, has marginal areas where philosophic difficulties
are encountered. But if a whole race of people finds itself confined
within a system which is set up and continued for the very purpose
of keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question is then sol-
emnly propounded whether such a race is being treated "equally," I
think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of phi-
losophers-that of laughter. The only question remaining (after we
get our laughter under control) is whether the segregation system
answers to this description. Here I must confess to a tendency to
start laughing all over again.
-Charles L. Black, Jr.'
* Dimond has been a professor of constitutional law at both Wayne State University and Ameri-
can University.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. L.L.B., Yale Law School, 1966; B.A. Hamilton College,
1963. Prior to joining the Yale faculty, the author was Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in
the Carter Administration from 1977-1980. In that capacity, he directed the Government's school
desegregation litigation, including arguing the ColumbusIDayton cases before the Supreme Court and
initiating the Yonkers lawsuit described in some detail in this review.
1. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960).
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I.
Few could have anticipated at the time of the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education2 that the legitimacy of school desegregation would
still be a subject of profound national debate over thirty years later. Yet
public controversy continues largely unabated over questions that go to the
very heart of the desegregation process. Does desegregation have any edu-
cational justification? Is busing an acceptable desegregation technique
under any circumstances? Are the social and economic costs associated
with desegregation so great as to justify abandoning the enterprise alto-
gether? Given the complexity of such issues, all sides of the debate have
been able to find at least some plausible scholarly and anecdotal support
for their arguments.'
This state of affairs prompts one to ask whether the current debate
would have been different had school desegregation remained largely a
Southern phenomenon devoted to eradicating the state-imposed systems of
racial separation in public education pervasive throughout that region.
For opposition to desegregation did not gain national support until the
process began moving North. It was only then that Congress became in-
terested in the subject, considering and, sometimes, enacting thereafter leg-
islation designed to curtail both judicial and administrative responses to
public school segregation. 4 Presidents saw fit to place desegregation on
2. 347 U.s. 483 (1954).
3. For a sampling of this debate in the literature, compare J. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERI-
CAN DII.EMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984) (generally supportive
of comprehensive desegregation) with R. WOLTFRS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF
SCHOO. DESEGREGATION (1984) (critical study of desegregation aftermath in Topeka, Kansas and
four other communities whose cases were decided along with Brown). Both books are reviewed in
Marshall, The Burden of Assessing Brown (Book Review), 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 571 (1985). See
also T. SOWEL., CIVIL. RIGHT-S: RHETORIC OR REALITY, 61-72 (1984) (criticizing pro-desegregation
policies); Jones, The Desegregation of Urban Schools Thirty Years After Brown, 55 COLO. L. REV.
515 (1984) (urging the implementation of comprehensive desegregation remedies). For two recent
studies of specific desegregation cases, see D. MONTI, A SEMBLANCE OF JUSTICE: ST. LOUIS SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION AND ORDER IN URBAN AMERICA (1985), and R. PRIDE & J. WOODARD, THE
BURDEN OF BUSING: THE POLITICS OF DESEGREGATION IN NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE (1985). Re-
newed interest in the desegregation debate has probably been sparked in some quarters by the Reagan
Administration's opposition to certain traditional techniques for establishing constitutional violations
and to certain remedies, especially busing, in school cases. See School Desegregation: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 614 (1982) (statement of William B. Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Divi-
sion) ("The administration is thus clearly and unequivocally on record as opposing the use of
mandatory transportation of students to achieve racial balance as an element of relief in future deseg-
regation cases."). I have discussed the current administration's policies in more detail in Days, Turn-
ing Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
309, 319-30, 339-41 (1984).
4. See Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980), for a history of existing congressional
prohibitions against the ordering of busing as a desegregation remedy by the Department of Educa-
tion. Efforts to divest federal courts of jurisdiction over school desegregation cases have thus far proven
unsuccessful. See Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Congressman Peter Rodino
(May 6, 1982), reprinted in Hearings on § 951 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
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School Desegregation in the 1980's
their agendas, particularly the issue of busing.5 Civil rights coalitions that
had fought so successfully in the courts and Congress to promote desegre-
gation in the South began to unravel as their members increasingly found
themselves on opposing sides over desegregation at home in the North and
West.
6
Not all this newfound opposition to desegregation can be attributed to
racism, political expediency and sheer hypocrisy. I believe that there were
many Northerners who had genuine difficulty in understanding how
school boards in their communities, where racial segregation had never
been required by law, could be found in violation of Brown. They saw
segregated schools in the North and West as largely the unavoidable con-
sequence of segregated residential patterns. School boards could not be
faulted, they felt, for adhering, on respectable educational grounds, to
neighborhood student assignment plans-even where doing so produced a
segregated school system that reflected the residential segregation.
Subsequent litigation should have shattered the myth that school boards
outside of the South have consistently applied racially neutral criteria in
administering their districts. Many people nevertheless continue to cling
to the view that intensely segregated school attendance patterns cannot be
laid entirely at the feet of school officials and that comprehensive desegre-
gation plans that require busing and the abandonment of neighborhood
schools are unwarranted and unfair. These misgivings have, in turn, made
Northerners and Westerners far more sympathetic to claims that current
segregation in the Deep South is similarly the result of demographics and
segregative forces beyond the control of school boards. Perhaps there is
something, they say to themselves, to Southerners' contention that they
have been unfairly punished by the courts for assigning children to neigh-
borhood schools, despite the fact that state-imposed segregation ended
years ago. They find themselves echoing many of the concerns previously
heard only in the Southern and Border States. What about these court-
ordered remedies? Even granting that the school board acted unconstitu-
tionally, does that conduct justify a system-wide busing plan? How can
we be certain that the cure will not be worse than the disease, leaving the
schools even more segregated after the court order? Hence, we see the
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 308-23
(1982).
5. See G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus?, 233-78, 279-316, 319-54 (1978), for a discussion of presi-
dential politics with respect to desegregation during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. See also M.
REBEI.I. & A. BLOCK, EQUALITY AND EDUCATION: FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN THE
NEw YORK Crrv SCHOOL SYSTEM 61-63 (1985); J. HOcHSCILD, supra note 3, at 16-18.
6. See, e.g., M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 5, at 83-85 (describing fragmentation among
groups generally committed to school desegregation over HEW's charges of discrimination in faculty
hiring and assignment in New York City school system). See also J. LUKAS, COMMON GROUND
(1985) (on Bostonians' responses to school desegregation).
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conversion of what initially was seen as a regional issue into a matter of
national importance. All involved in the debate over school desegregation
understand that its outcome will profoundly affect the future of the entire
country.
Paul Dimond has written an extraordinarily informative and thought-
ful book describing the process of bringing Brown North and the impact
this process had upon national attitudes toward desegregation. Though a
professor of constitutional law and an author of several significant works
on racial discrimination,' Dimond has written Beyond Busing based upon
his experiences as a lawyer who helped represent black plaintiffs in four
of the most important desegregation cases of the last decade, involving
school systems in Detroit (Milliken v. Bradley8 ), Wilmington (Evans v.
Buchanan9 ), Columbus (Columbus Board of Education v. Penick"0 ), and
Dayton (Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman"1 ). In Milliken, the
Supreme Court held that lower trial and appellate federal courts had
erred in ordering a metropolitan desegregation plan requiring busing be-
tween school districts to remedy proven intentional segregative acts of the
state and the Detroit school board within the Detroit district. In Evans,
however, lower federal courts found that the Supreme Court's standards
for metropolitan relief set forth in Milliken had been met sufficiently to
warrant such a remedy with respect to Wilmington and its neighboring
suburban school districts. The Supreme Court declined review. The Co-
lumbus and Dayton cases produced, as of this writing, the most definitive
Supreme Court articulation of the standards for adjudging the constitu-
tionality of racial segregation in school systems where separation of black
and white children had not been required or explicitly condoned by posi-
tive law.
In Beyond Busing, Dimond makes several important contributions to
the national debate. First, he provides an "anatomy" of a Northern school
desegregation case. Although many are now willing to concede that
Northern school boards have engaged in segregative activity, I doubt that
more than a few truly understand the variety and pervasive nature of such
7. P. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION (1985)
[hereinafter cited by page number only]. His previous writings include A DILEMMA OF LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT (1978) (co-authored with C. Chamberlain and W. Hillyard); School Segregation in the
North: There Is But One Constitution, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1972); Strict Construction
and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul
Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1982); The Anti-Caste Princi-
ple-Toward A Constitutional Standard for Review of Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1983).
8. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
9. 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del.), affd, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923
(1980).
10. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
11. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
1740
Vol. 95: 1737, 1986
HeinOnline -- 95 Yale L.J. 1740 1985-1986
School Desegregation in the 1980's
practices. Northern school boards have made racial assignments not only
of students, but of faculty and staff as well. They have also gerry-
mandered attendance zones, sited and closed old schools, changed grade
structures, and controlled school building capacities, all to further segrega-
tion. Dimond describes in extensive and accessible detail the exceptional
effort required of plaintiffs' lawyers to uncover these practices in North-
ern school cases and to demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that such
practices were responsible for much of the existing school segregation.
Even for those who already know the basic story of segregation in the
North, Dimond's description of the evidence, of the witnesses, of the law-
yers and judges, and of the other participants in these cases, gives the
familiar a power and poignancy that court opinions are unlikely ever to
communicate. One watches federal judges, initially skeptical of plaintiffs'
claims, slowly but firmly moved to understand that constitutional wrongs
had been committed for which effective remedies must be devised. Dimond
describes one lawyer, representing a group of intervening white neighbor-
hood associations opposed to desegregation in Detroit, who was so struck
by the force of the plaintiffs' case that he persuaded his clients to switch
sides, in effect, and to press for full desegregation.
Second, Dimond's book is not only about school boards. It is also very
much about residential segregation and about government culpability in
creating it. He uses as his example Hills v. Gautreaux,12 the Chicago
public housing discrimination case. Although he was not involved in that
case, Dimond gives it the same intimate treatment he accords the four
school desegregation cases. Like those cases, Gautreaux is a story, as told
by Dimond, of the movement from initial judicial hostility to plaintiffs'
claim to full recognition by the courts that the law had been violated. The
charge there-upheld by both lower courts and, ultimately, the Supreme
Court-was that the intense segregation of public housing was not purely
the result of voluntary choice and economic imperatives. Quite the con-
trary, plaintiffs alleged that the Chicago Housing Authority actively en-
gaged in segregative conduct over a number of years, conduct that the
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development took no steps to
prevent or correct. Dimond's full treatment of Gautreaux, supplemented
by his shorter discussions of the facts surrounding two additional housing
discrimination cases decided by the Supreme Court,13 provides a compel-
ling rebuttal to those who claim that residential segregation is the result of
purely adventitious events and, consequently, is not a proper subject for
constitutional adjudication.
12. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
13. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dcv. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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However, it is the third feature of Dimond's book that, in my estima-
tion, lifts it far above the level of the all-too-familiar trial lawyer's collec-
tion of war stories. He has succeeded in translating his practical experi-
ence into a telling critique of the Supreme Court's school desegregation
jurisprudence. Dimond's thesis is that segregated schools are produced by
several factors of constitutional significance: (1) school boards take inten-
tional action-such as racial assignment of students, faculty, and staff and
other techniques already mentioned-to maintain a significant degree of
racial separation in neighborhood schools; (2) the school boards' actions
help create segregated neighborhoods, as families move towards the
schools that their children attend; and (3) governmental institutions (local,
state and federal) other than school boards promote further segregated
residential areas through a wide variety of discriminatory practices. 14 Di-
mond's book analyzes and laments the Supreme Court's assiduous refusal
to address forthrightly this third contention as an unconstitutional source
of school segregation. It is to a consideration and elaboration of this cri-
tique, one I share with Dimond,' 5 that I will devote the balance of my
comments.
II.
As Dimond notes, the Supreme Court has concluded that the first two
sources of segregated schools violate the Constitution and, where found,
justify ordering school boards to undertake remedial desegregation pro-
grams. Given the fact that, at the time of Brown, positive law in Southern
and Border states required or condoned segregated schools, the Supreme
Court had little difficulty for the next fifteen years attributing the contin-
ued existence of one race or virtually one-race schools to unconstitutional
local board action. School boards were charged, therefore, with an affirm-
ative responsibility to eradicate these dual systems "root and branch."1"
The debate over school board responsibility for segregated schools arose
in the North in districts that either had never been subject to laws pro-
moting segregation or had repealed them almost seventy-five years before
Brown was decided. As a matter of history, it should be pointed out, as
Dimond does only in part in discussing the early Northern desegregation
case in Cincinnati,' that school board responsibility was not even clearly
raised as an issue in many desegregation cases filed during the early
14. Pp. 56-59.
15. See 74 F.R.D. 271-76 (1976), for an earlier expression of my concern about the direction of
school desegregation law.
16. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
17. P. 26 (discussing Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 847 (1967), reaffirmed after remand to district court, 419 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969)).
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1960's in Northern communities. Rather, the plaintiffs' central claim was
that racial segregation (often referred to as "racial imbalance") violated
Brown irrespective of school board culpability for the condition. What
they argued, in essence, was that this form of segregation, while not so
pernicious as that addressed directly by Brown, was, nevertheless, suffi-
ciently harmful to the self-esteem, education and life chances of black chil-
dren to justify imposing upon school boards an affirmative duty to take
corrective action. Lower federal courts generally dismissed these argu-
ments.1 8 In fact, they flatly excluded evidence in school cases related to the
impact of residential segregation upon segregated schools, on the grounds
that the condition was created by parties not before the court and not
subject to school board control.19
During this period, the Supreme Court avoided confronting these issues
by denying review.20 In the early 1970's, however, it considered Keyes v.
School District No. 1,21 the Denver, Colorado case. There, the lower
courts held that, even though Colorado and Denver had never required or
condoned segregated schools by law, the Denver school board nevertheless
had engaged in intentionally segregative acts that violated the Fourteenth
Amendment rights of black and Mexican-American children. Where, as
in Denver, the school board had been engaged in a "systematic program
of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools,
teachers and facilities," the board could properly be held to be administer-
ing a dual system in violation of Brown.22 After the Denver decision, it
was no longer legally accurate or helpful to distinguish between Southern
and Northern school segregation. Judges in Northern desegregation cases
would, thereafter, have to focus explicitly upon the extent to which school
board action produced racial separation, free of any presumption to the
contrary.
Ironically, the Supreme Court's first recognition of the second source of
segregated schools, namely, segregated residential areas that had devel-
18. See, e.g., Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Craggett v.
Board of Educ., 338 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1964); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819, 831 (N.D. Ind.),
affd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). But see Taylor v. Board of
Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961) (New Rochelle, N.Y. board found
guilty of intentional segregation); Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (de
facto segregation ordered remedied); Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
For a comprehensive discussion of this period, see Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REv. 564 (1965).
19. Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d at 60 n.4, 419 F.2d at 1392.
20. See, e.g., Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914
(1965); Bell v. School City Gary, Indiana, 213 F. Supp. 819, 831 (N.D. Ind.), affld, 324 F.2d 209
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
21. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
22. Id. at 201.
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oped partly as a result of segregative actions by school boards, occurred in
a Southern rather than a Northern case.13 In 1971, the Court considered
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education24 claims by the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina school district that, though segre-
gated schools had been required by state law at the time of Brown, the
board had for some years operated its schools on a nondiscriminatory ba-
sis. To the extent that its system was still largely segregated, the board
claimed that the situation was not of its making. Instead, the board con-
tended, forces over which it had no control had created residential segre-
gation that necessarily resulted in segregated neighborhood schools. The
Supreme Court's response, affirming lower court findings, was, first, that
the Charlotte board had never discharged its affirmative duty imposed by
Brown to dismantle its prior state-imposed dual system, and instead had
engaged, post-Brown, in a series of intentionally segregative acts. Second,
its answer to the board's denial of responsibility for residential segrega-
tion, reflected in segregated neighborhood schools, was that there was a
reciprocal segregative effect for which the board must be held partially
responsible. According to the Court, not only are schools placed where
people move, but people move to where schools are placed. Consequently,
the board's practices of opening and abandoning schools and of changing
grade structures and attendance boundaries of schools to maintain segre-
gation played a part in people's decisions as to where they would live.25
The Swann decision was a crucial development in school desegregation
law, for it broke a "log-jam" in the lower federal courts with respect to
the nature and scope of the remedial duty that had delayed meaningful
relief in many Southern communities for years." Moreover, it provided
building blocks for the assault in Keyes upon Northern school segrega-
tion.27 Although the Supreme Court's rejection of the Charlotte board's
claim was not surprising in view of the district's history of state-imposed
racial separation, one would have thought that the Denver board, acting
in a state and city with no such history, would have had more success
asserting similar claims. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found Swann
controlling.
23. Some Northern courts had recognized this point, however, in passing on claims of segregative
site selection for school construction. See, e.g., Sealy v. Department of Pub. Instruction, 159 F. Supp.
561 (E.D. Pa. 1957), affd, 252 F.2d 898 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958).
24. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For an insightful analysis of Swann and its implications for desegregation
remedies, see Note, Judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YALE L.J. 1741,
1747-52 (1985).
25. Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21.
26. See ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-1980, at 4-5
(1983).
27. See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegrega-
tion, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697 (1971).
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In retrospect, the Court's failure in Swann to address candidly the rela-
tionship between school and residential segregation may be significantly
responsible, however unintended at the time, for the lack of realism that
characterizes today's debate over both liability and remedy in school cases.
The truth, which the Court refused to acknowledge except in passing,28
was that forces beyond the school board's control had produced segrega-
tive effects in Charlotte schools. Schools that had been white in 1954 were
black in 1971 as white families moved out of adjacent neighborhoods and
black families moved in. Economics had allowed many whites but not
blacks to move into areas on the fringes of the city or in its suburbs, away
from concentrations of blacks. The Court's failure there was not, then,
that it held the board responsible in part for the residential segregation
that its neighborhood schools served. It was clearly correct to do so.
Rather, it failed by refusing to assess the nature and impact of other
forces upon residential segregation and segregated schools.2
The Court's omission in this connection, obscured by a unanimous
opinion in Swann,30 was subjected in the Denver case to stinging criticism
from two Justices usually at opposite ends of the spectrum on racial dis-
28.
The failure of local authorities to meet their constitutional obligations aggravated the massive
problem of converting from the state-enforced discrimination of racially separate school sys-
tems. This process has been rendered more difficult by changes since 1954 in the structure and
patterns of communities, the growth of student population, movement of families, and other
changes, some of which had marked impact on school planning, sometimes neutralizing or
negating remedial action before it was fully implemented. Rural areas accustomed for half a
century to the consolidated school systems implemented by bus transportation could make ad-
justments more readily than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting population, numerous
schools, congested and complex traffic patterns.
Swann, 402 U.S. at 14 (citations omitted).
29. It is arguable that the Court in Swann simply meant to postpone larger questions of state
responsibility for segregated schools to another day:
The elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large task and one that should
not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school
authorities. One vehicle can carry only a limited amount of baggage. It would not serve the
important objective of Brown I to seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond
their scope, although desegregation of schools ultimately will have impact on other forms of
discrimination. We do not reach in this case the question whether a showing that school segre-
gation is a consequence of other types of state action, without any discriminatory action by the
school authorities, is a constitutional violation requiring remedial action by a school desegre-
gation decree. This case does not present that question and we therefore do not decide it.
Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added).
Subsequent events have revealed, however, as the discussion below reflects, that both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have treated this language less as a postponement in addressing such
issues than a suggestion that they may not appropriately be raised in school desegregation suits.
30. Without intending to rekindle the heated controversy sparked by Woodward and Armstrong,
B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 95-112 (1979), I think that their description of
the intense negotiations that produced unanimity in Swann is consistent with what others have noted
about the opinion's ambiguities, see Fiss, supra note 27, at 703 n.11, and with a description in a
recent scholarly treatment of how the Court arrived at its decision in Swann, see B. SCHWARTZ,
SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL. BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT 127, 149 (1986).
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crimination questions.3 Both Justice Powell and Justice Douglas pointed
out that school boards alone could not be held responsible for the contin-
ued existence of segregated schools, either in the North or South. Rather,
they argued that a variety of other forces contributed to the creation and
maintenance of segregated neighborhood schools. As to the nature of such
other forces, however, Powell and Douglas differed markedly, the former
arguing that private choice and economic conditions caused residential
segregation, the latter seeing the source of the problem as a web of gov-
ernmental segregative action working in tandem with demographic fac-
tors. Not surprisingly, in view of their quite different visions of the
sources of residential segregation, Justice Powell concluded that a school
board could discharge its constitutional duty in a highly segregated resi-
dential community merely by adhering to a strict neighborhood school as-
signment policy. Justice Douglas, in contrast, took the position that one
state agency, the school board, should be held responsible for remedying
the condition of school segregation caused by other governmental institu-
tions. For him, state responsibility could not be so fragmented as to leave
the victims of governmentally fostered segregated schools with no remedy
whatsoever.3 2 Justice Douglas' opinion in Keyes is as close as the Supreme
Court has ever come to recognizing Dimond's third argument as to the
source of segregated schools.
IlI.
Instead of grappling directly with the complexity of residential segrega-
tion as it bears on segregated schools, the Court has over the last eighteen
years placed an impressive array of procedural hurdles in the paths of
school boards seeking to avoid liability for continued racial segregation.
The first of these hurdles was the continuing affirmative responsibility of
school boards in systems that formerly had been segregated by order of
state statute to eradicate "root and branch" the existence of white schools
and black schools. This duty played an important role in the Court's reso-
lution of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case. It was originally articulated,
however, three years before Swann in a masterpiece of test case litigation:
Green v. County School Board.
3
-
For ten years after Brown, school boards fought any, even token, inte-
gration tooth and nail. Civil rights lawyers ultimately defeated a series of
31. See Keyes v. Denver School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 214 (1973) (opin-
ion of Douglas, J.); 413 U.S. at 217 (opinion of Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Justice Douglas' view of the state has long been a part of Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F.
Supp. 649, 658 (E.D. La. 1961).
33. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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these efforts to maintain the status quo ante. In the mid-1960's, however,
in hopes of delaying desegregation further, many school boards began in-
stituting so-called freedom-of-choice plans. Under these plans, black and
white children formerly assigned to segregated schools by law could
choose to attend schools in which their race was not in the majority. Given
the inertia produced by generations of segregation and threats directed
against those considering transfers, it is not surprising that few students
sought reassignment. However, some lower federal courts viewed such
plans as eminently fair and non-coercive. 4 Others found them consistent
with what they understood to be the responsibility imposed upon school
boards by Brown: to desegregate, not to integrate.35 In other words, courts
believed that the school boards' duty was only to end racial assignment of
students, not to correct for continuing segregation that flowed from earlier
state-imposed racial assignment practices.
In order to present an effective challenge to freedom-of-choice plans,
plaintiffs' lawyers needed a case that starkly presented the continued exis-
tence of segregation and the unlikelihood of its being remedied without
affirmative school board action. Green,3" the New Kent County school
case, provided such an opportunity. New Kent had one white school and
one black school at the time of Brown, a situation that had improved little
in the subsequent decade, despite a board-initiated freedom-of-choice plan
that permitted students to transfer to the school from which they previ-
ously had been excluded by law. During the three years that this program
was in effect, not a single white child chose to attend the school histori-
cally designated for blacks, and only a small percentage of blacks enrolled
in the traditionally all-white facility. From a demographic standpoint, not
much had changed in rural New Kent County during the intervening
years: There was no significant residential segregation either at the time
of Brown or ten years later.37
In view of this factual pattern, it was clear to the Court that the crea-
34. Indeed, many freedom-of-choice plans required every pupil to exercise a choice at the start of
each school year rather than automatically assigning them back to the one-race schools they previously
attended. In other cases, however, unless students opted to transfer to schools traditionally designated
for children of the opposite race, student assignments remained unchanged. For a general discussion of
such plans, see Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966);
Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 728 (1986).
35. This formulation is usually attributed to a three-judge court decision in Briggs v. Elliott, 132
F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ("The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration.
It merely forbids discrimination."). In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in the
mid-1960's that affirmative steps were required. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), affd en banc, 380 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
36. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The two companion cases decided with
Green, Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968), and Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S.
450 (1968), similarly did not involve large urban or metropolitan areas.
37. Green, 391 U.S. at 442 n.6.
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tion and continued existence of the segregated schools were the result of
board action, unaffected by other forces, governmental or otherwise. The
Court also recognized that the remedy for this continued segregation lay
within the power of the board.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, however, presented a far more complex picture
of school board liability for continuing segregation than did New Kent
County. In Swann there was evidence of residential segregation both
before and after Brown, caused by forces of which segregative school
board action was only one. Moreover, the presence of these other forces
raised questions not evident in Green about the board's ability to devise
an effective desegregation remedy. Despite these significant differences,
the Court applied the Green precedent to the facts of Swann. The Court's
only concession to the reality of intervening segregative causes was to per-
mit the school board, in devising a comprehensive remedy, to demonstrate
that remaining one-race schools were not solely the vestiges of the former
dual system but the result of other forces as well.
38
The second procedural hurdle for school boards was formulated in
Keyes, the Denver case. Lower courts found intentional segregative school
board action with respect to only some schools within the district. Yet
there existed throughout the system a high degree of segregation of blacks
and Mexican-Americans from whites. How could a system-wide remedy
be justified under these circumstances? The Court had two answers. First,
it held that where intentional segregative action was found to have been
present in a significant part of the system, unconstitutional intent would
be presumed at work throughout the system as a whole.
3 9 Second, where
segregative effects of intentional board action could be found in a signifi-
cant part of the system, similar effects would be presumed as to the entire
system.'0 The board was free, however, to rebut either of these presump-
tions through the introduction of competent evidence.41 Stated differently,
faced with uncertainty as to the impact of forces other than the school
board's upon racial separation, the Court placed upon the board, rather
than upon the plaintiffs, the burden of sorting out the nature, scope and
effect of such forces.
The third and most recent procedural hurdle was set up by the Su-
preme Court in the Columbus/Dayton"' decisions. In the late 1880's,
38. Swann, 402 U.S. at 26.
39. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S 189, 203 (1973).
40. Id. at 201-05.
41. The Court invited the school board, in the event it could not disprove the claim of segregative
intent, to show for example "that its past segregative acts did not create or contribute to the current
segregated condition" of schools outside the geographic area where its illegal conduct had occurred. Id.
at 211.
42. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
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Ohio repealed laws requiring racial segregation in public schools. Until
the early part of this century, Columbus and Dayton assigned children,
for the most part, on a non-racial basis. Thereafter, however, both dis-
tricts began a systematic practice of racial assignment of faculty, staff and
students, which in the case of faculty and staff continued almost to the
time desegregation suits were filed in the early 1970's. In addition, both
districts employed many of the other classic segregative techniques.
In the Dayton case, which was decided before Columbus at the trial
court level, the district court found that the board had engaged, decades
earlier, in systematic racial assignment practices. The court concluded,
however, that these practices had long ago ceased and that existing evi-
dence of contemporary segregative actions was insufficient to justify sys-
tem-wide relief, even considering the Keyes43 presumptions. After three
trips to the court of appeals to prod an unsympathetic trial court judge to
action, the plaintiffs' lawyers obtained an order requiring a system-wide
desegregation plan in Dayton.
44
Before this order could be implemented, however, the Supreme Court
granted review. In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court reversed
the court of appeals, holding that the circuit court's system-wide desegre-
gation rulings were unsupported by the record.'5 It remanded the case to
the district court for more specific findings respecting the plaintiffs' claims
of segregative activity by the board. Central to Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion was the novel principle of "incremental segregative effect.""4' Though
lawyers on both sides of the school desegregation question had difficulty
understanding its full implications, the principle, viewed most narrowly,
seemed to suggest that the Dayton and other federal trial courts should (1)
identify segregative board actions; (2) assess their impact upon segregated
schools in the district discounted by factors beyond the school board's re-
sponsibility; and (3) order a remedy directed only to that residuum of
segregation directly attributable to the board.
The Dayton I decision, as it has come to be called, appeared to turn
Keyes on its head: rather than enjoying a presumption that a school
board's intentional segregative actions created a segregative effect, plain-
tiffs now would have the burden of rebutting a presumption that forces
beyond the school board's control were largely responsible for the existing
segregation. Upon remand in Dayton I and at trial in Columbus, plain-
tiffs' lawyers set about to undermine this concept of "incremental segrega-
443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II).
43. The district court's ruling is described in the court of appeals' decision reversing it. Brinkman
v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974).
44. See pp. 147-64.
45. 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Dayton I).
46. Id. at 420.
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tive effect." Suffice it to say that this effort was successful. The Supreme
Court decided in its second consideration of the Dayton case (Dayton
I/), 47 heard with Columbus, that Dayton I was not to be read as a rejec-
tion of Keyes. Moreover, the Court finally accepted a doctrine that had
been urged upon it unsuccessfully in Dayton I which, even more clearly
than the Keyes presumptions, placed the burden on school boards either to
prove the effects of intervening segregative forces or submit to the imposi-
tion of system-wide remedies. Specifically, the Court applied the full force
of the affirmative duty to desegregate that was articulated in Green, a
Southern case, to systems that had not been required by law to segregate
children for ninety years. According to the Court, the records in Colum-
bus and Dayton reflected that both school districts at the time of Brown
were operating dual school systems, albeit by board action rather than
pursuant to positive law. Consequently, from that date on, both boards
had an affirmative constitutional duty to eradicate their dual system "root
and branch." 4
The feature of this new doctrine most favorable to plaintiffs' lawyers in
Northern school cases was the lower level of proof required to justify sys-
tem-wide remedies. Under Keyes, plaintiffs had the initial burden of es-
tablishing that the school board acted with segregative intent. Columbusl
Dayton II, however, required plaintiffs to prove only that a dual system
existed in 1954 and that the school board actions had had segregative ef-
fect. Board conduct that in another context might be viewed as "neutral,"
such as strict assignment of students to neighborhood schools, would fail
under that test. Such acts would simply be further proof of the board's
failure to discharge its affirmative responsibility to desegregate.
The Court's adoption of these three procedural hurdles undoubtedly
was driven in part by a desire to avoid the difficult problems of multiple
causality in school segregation cases. In fairness, however, the Court also
relied upon important public policy considerations, as well as upon well-
established legal doctrine outside the desegregation area. In Swann, the
board's own delay in complying with Brown had allowed intervening seg-
regative forces to work their effects. If the Court had entertained the
board's claims seriously, it would have provided further excuses for Char-
lotte and other districts in the Southern and Border states to delay, ren-
dering even more difficult the implementation of any meaningful remedy.
The Keyes presumptions also find support in other areas of the law,
notably antitrust.4 9 Where a plaintiff is able to show, for example, that
47. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
48. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979).
49. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-25 (1969).
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the defendant engaged in monopolistic practices in violation of the anti-
trust laws to the plaintiff's detriment, the burden shifts to the defendant to
show the extent to which forces other than its own illegal conduct contrib-
uted to the plaintiff's injury. Absent such a showing, the defendant must
bear full responsibility for the plaintiff's injury. The "risk of uncertainty"
with respect to causality is borne by the violator rather than the victim.
Furthermore, one can locate in tort law, the font of causality principles,
support for the Court's rejection of the boards' claims in both the Colum-
bus and Dayton II cases. Just as tortfeasors may not avoid responsibility
by claiming that others had also acted illegally, school boards would not
be allowed to escape liability by arguing that, while they may have acted
unconstitutionally, segregated schools would have resulted for other rea-
sons, even without their involvement.50
In contrast, the Court's setting of 1954 as the bright line for the imposi-
tion of an affirmative desegregative responsibility upon school districts
outside of, as well as in, the South was nothing less than a tour de force.
As already indicated, school boards in the South, to which Brown was
specifically addressed, did not learn from the Supreme Court until at least
1968 that such an affirmative responsibility existed. Moreover, it was not
until 197151 that Southern systems were given clear guidance from the
Court as to how that affirmative responsibility was to be discharged. Fi-
nally, the Court did not seem to regard Ohio's pre-1887 history of state-
imposed segregation as a dispositive factor in its decision to link Columbus
and Dayton with New Kent County and Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Conse-
quently, the Ohio school boards understandably, but unsuccessfully, ar-
gued that it was the 1973 Keyes decision, announced after the Dayton suit
was filed, and not Brown, that established for the first time the constitu-
tional responsibilities of systems with no recent history of state-imposed
segregated schools.
However much one seeks to explain these decisions, from Green to Co-
lumbus/Dayton II, in precedential terms, below the surface they appear
to reflect frustration on the Court in the face of several realities. First, the
50. See generally W. KEt.-roN, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORS § 41, at 265-68 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing substantial factor analysis); RE-
S I'IXMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs, § 433B, comment on subsection (1) (same). Subsequent to Keyes,
the Court made explicit this burden-shifting process in constitutional litigation. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977); Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
51. Swann, 402 U.S. at 1. Though only injunctive relief was sought in these desegregation cases,
it is nevertheless interesting to compare this approach to that taken with respect to the immunity of
government officials for unconstitutional conduct, where clarity of controlling law is critical in estab-
lishing liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known"); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 322 (1975) (defendant "knew or reasonably should have known" conduct was unconstitutional).
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Justices could not ignore the fact that twenty to twenty-five years after
Brown, many school districts had not even begun meaningful desegrega-
tion efforts. Further passage of time would make the development of
meaningful desegregation remedies exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.
Second, it was no longer possible to pretend that the continued existence
of unconstitutionally segregated schools was only a Southern, rather than
a national, problem. The Court would have to devise doctrines that re-
sponded accordingly.
Not only school boards faced procedural hurdles during this period,
however, as Dimond's thorough treatment of the Detroit and Wilming-
ton 52 cases reveals. In Detroit, the plaintiffs were able to establish that the
local school board and the State of Michigan had acted in tandem to cre-
ate and maintain segregated schools within the city of Detroit. Addition-
ally, the record reflected a pattern of school construction that had been
approved and funded by the state both within the Detroit district and in
neighboring suburban districts that contributed to the segregated character
of all schools in the area. Schools in Detroit were overwhelmingly major-
ity black and Hispanic; those in the suburbs were almost all-white.
The lower courts concluded that this history of segregative activity by
both the Detroit school board and the state of Michigan necessitated a
remedy that went beyond the limits of Detroit to encompass many of the
surrounding districts.53 Like Justice Douglas in Keyes, those courts viewed
the "state" as the principal governmental entity reached by the Fourteenth
Amendment: Where the state was shown to have violated the Constitu-
tion, courts could order remedies to the full extent of the state's power to
implement them. The fact that the state of Michigan had decided to dele-
gate some responsibilities for public education to numerous local districts
should not disable federal courts from providing effective remedies for the
state's segregative acts. Whether the suburban districts themselves had en-
gaged in segregative acts was, under this theory, irrelevant.
The Supreme Court disagreed. In Milliken v. Bradley, it rejected the
proposed metropolitan remedy, announcing the principle that only where
there is a "constitutional violation within one district that produces a sig-
nificant segregative effect in another district,"" would interdistrict deseg-
regation be constitutionally justified. Failing that, federal courts must re-
spect the "deeply rooted" tradition in American public education, honored
in Michigan, of local control over the operation of schools. The Court
52. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del.
1978), affd, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
53. 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affid, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
54. 418 U.S. at 745.
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found no significant segregative effects with respect to the fifty-three dis-
tricts surrounding Detroit.
In Evans v. Buchanan,55 the Wilmington desegregation case, the plain-
tiffs' lawyers were able to meet the strictures imposed by Milliken. But
success there was facilitated by two distinctive features. First, Delaware
had been before the Supreme Court as a party to one of the cases decided
with Brown, urging the constitutionality of its "separate-but-equal" pub-
lic school attendance laws.56 Second, the state had at that time and for
many years thereafter engaged directly in the creation and maintenance of
segregation throughout the state, ignoring local district lines to accomplish
that end. Unlike Michigan, therefore, Delaware had committed segrega-
tive acts that resulted in a virtually all-black city school system (Wilming-
ton) as well as substantially all-white schools in the suburban areas sur-
rounding that city (New Castle County). The lesson of Evans, it seems to
me, is that whatever hope Milliken left of plaintiffs' obtaining metropoli-
tan desegregation remedies lay in Deep South or Border communities
where states engaged in pervasive segregative actions cutting across district
lines. Though there may be successful interdistrict lawsuits of this type,57
the restricted vision of government responsibility remains the principal
legacy of Milliken: The state may act through various and sundry entities
to create and promote segregated schools; but only where it can be proven
that the state acts through particular school boards or directly upon school
systems will desegregation remedies be justified, on either an interdistrict
or intradistrict basis.
IV.
Why has the Court not addressed directly the role of governmental in-
stitutions other than school boards in fostering the residential segregation
that is reflected in segregated schools and school districts, North and
South? As Dimond recounts in some detail, the explanation cannot lie in
the Court's ignorance of such segregative forces in American life. Through
its own decisions, the Court has documented the pervasive nature of gov-
ernment imposed or condoned housing discrimination, "a relic of slav-
55. 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del.), affid, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923
(1980).
56. Gebhart v. Belton, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); pp. 298-301.
57. Indeed, several post-Milliken interdistrict remedies have been ordered in such contexts. E.g.,
Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1071 (1980); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672
F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County
Special School Dist. No. 1, 584 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Ark.), res'd, 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1984). But see
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, slip op. (W.D. Mo. June 5, 1984) (rejection of interdis-
trict remedy); Armour v. Nix, No. 16708, slip op. (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 1979), affid mem., 446 U.S.
930 (1980) (same).
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ery."58 Government actions have ranged from ordinances that forbade any
black person to establish a home in a white community (or vice-versa)
59 to
restrictive covenants enforced by state and federal courts,
0 to the use of
referenda to frustrate state and local efforts to achieve housing
integration.61
The centerpiece of this story, one Dimond's book takes as a major fo-
cus, is the Gautreaux case.6 2 It is a textbook example of how the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) was able to maintain well into the 1970's a
starkly segregated pattern of public housing with the approval of federal
housing authorities. One of the Court's most important conclusions was
that the Chicago Housing Authority's segregative actions, abetted by the
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), re-
sulted not only in keeping black and white housing apart within the City
of Chicago, but also in ensuring that public housing outside of the city
remained largely white. For, as the Court found, HUD had consciously
refused to construct public housing outside of Chicago, which it had
power to do, joining instead with the CHA in keeping blacks in segre-
gated public housing within the city limits. Based upon these findings, the
Court approved lower court orders requiring housing remedies in Gau-
treaux that crossed city-suburb boundaries.
Moreover, in a number of school cases the Supreme Court has been
presented with records containing substantial evidence and lower court
findings of government policies and practices, apart from school board ac-
tion, that contributed significantly to both housing segregation and segre-
gated schools.6" The plaintiffs' lawyers in the Swann case introduced evi-
dence on how local, state and federal agencies had promoted and helped to
maintain segregated residential patterns through private home mortgaging
practices, location of public housing, urban renewal projects and construc-
tion of highways. Both the trial and appellate courts found this evidence
persuasive." Yet the Supreme Court's reaction to such evidence and find-
ings was essentially to ignore it, stating, "one vehicle can carry only a
limited amount of baggage. "65
58. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
59. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
60. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
61. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
62. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
63. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183, 189 (S.D. Ind. 1978), af/'d in
part & vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101, 1110-11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980)
(violations by Housing Authority of the City of Indianapolis partial basis for ordering limited in-
terdistrict remedy); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 435 (D. Del.) (three-judge court), af'd
per curiam, 423 U.S. 963 (1975) (court found violations by Wilmington Housing Authority and
ordered interdistrict remedy).
64. 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970).
65. Swann, 402 U.S. at 22. As I mentioned earlier, this phrase could be read as simply an indica-
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In discussing the trial of Milliken, the Detroit case, Dimond describes
the painstaking efforts he and his co-counsel made to "educate" the trial
judge on this issue, efforts that proved successful. They presented proof,
for example, that the Michigan Supreme Court enforced racially restric-
tive covenants in real estate contracts right through to the day in 1948 that
the United States Supreme Court ruled such practices unconstitutional in
Shelley v. Kraemer (from St. Louis) and its companion case from Detroit,
McGee v. Sipes."6 They established, moreover, that in 1947 racially re-
strictive covenants blanketed those areas of Detroit that were still all-
white in 1971, and that such restrictive covenants also were prevalent in
all of the city's suburbs that had been platted by 1950. Such covenants
continued to appear in all subsequent deeds, abstracts and title insurance
policies of Detroit's largest title company until 1969.
The attorneys also offered probative evidence of direct governmental in-
volvement in creating and maintaining residential segregation. The Fed-
eral Housing Administration (FHA), for example, had promoted racial
restrictions and "whites only" private housing in Detroit. Racially dual
public housing was constructed with black projects in designated black
tracts and white projects in neighborhoods reserved for whites. Michigan
governmental agencies with responsibility for the licensing of real estate
brokers encouraged their licensees to engage in practices that reinforced
residential segregation, including discriminatory treatment of black real-
tors. And law enforcement officials consistently failed in their duty to pro-
tect blacks seeking homes in traditionally white areas of Detroit from mob
violence that successfully drove them from their intended new homes.
The plaintiffs' expert witnesses gave unrebutted testimony that the ra-
cial exclusion of blacks from all-white areas did not stop at the Detroit
city limits but extended throughout the neighboring white suburbs. They
also testified that racial discrimination, not "free choice" or "economics,"
appeared to be a primary cause of residential segregation in Detroit. Alto-
gether, the evidence strongly suggested that blacks lacked the option many
defenders of neighborhood schools claimed; they could not readily move to
provide their children with a desegregated education.
In addition to this "Detroit-specific" evidence, the plaintiffs' lawyers
introduced expert testimony with respect to federal government support
for residential segregation nationally. They testified that the Federal
Housing Administration had long endorsed racial segregation and sup-
tion that the Court wished to leave this issue for another day, because it had ample basis for requiring
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board to implement a system-wide desegregation plan. See supra note 29.
But I think that the phrase is properly read in view of the Court's subsequent actions as a "door-
closer" to consideration of such issues in school cases.
66. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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ported all-white developments, requiring, for example, in a late 1930's
underwriters' manual (still in use in the 1950's) that "whites-only" hous-
ing be served by "whites only" public schools. Additionally, the plaintiffs'
experts testified that the Veterans Administration, the Federal Public
Housing Agency, the Home Loan Bank Board, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation all supported residential segregation for many years, and,
even after their active support ended, that they were indifferent to the
continuing segregative effects of their past practices. All told, these federal
agencies had been involved with approximately eighty percent of the hous-
ing built in the United States since the mid-1930's.
The trial judge in Detroit found, based upon this evidence, that
"[g]overnmental actions and inaction at all levels, federal, state and local,
have combined, with those of private organizations, such as loaning insti-
tutions and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to
maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit
metropolitan area. ' '11 However, when the court of appeals upheld the
lower court's interdistrict remedy, it refused to consider the housing segre-
gation evidence, except as it pertained directly to the school board's poli-
cies with respect to the siting of facilities.6" And the Supreme Court,
speaking through the Chief Justice, held that "the case [did] not present
any question concerning possible state housing violations,"" even though
the plaintiffs strenuously urged such grounds in support of the lower
court orders.
Similar evidence of governmental responsibility for residential segrega-
tion was presented in the Columbus and Wilmington cases, with similar
judicial responses. In Columbus, the trial judge found that housing segre-
gation there was pervasive and long-standing and that housing choices
were "constrained because in reality there is a dual housing market; one
for blacks and another for whites,' 70 created and maintained by racially
discriminatory practices of federal agencies, local housing authorities, fi-
nancing institutions, developers, landlords, and real estate brokers, and by
the use of restrictive covenants, zoning, and annexation. In Evans, the
Wilmington case, a three-judge federal court found that "since Brown
67. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. at 392.
68. Milliken, 484 F.2d at 242. But see E. WOLF, TRIAL AND ERROR (1981); Wolf, Northern
School Desegregation and Residential Choice, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 63, in which the theory of recip-
rocal segregative effects between school board action and residential patterns is criticized both gener-
ally and specifically as adopted by the trial judge in the Detroit case. Dimond's book acknowledges
and briefly responds to Wolf's latter critique as factually incorrect and drawn from the transcript
alone, unaided by a sense of dynamics present during trial of the Detroit case.
69. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 728 n.7.
70. Penick v. Columbus, 429 F. Supp. 229, 258 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
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governmental authorities have contributed to the racial isolation of city
from suburbs," and that these authorities "are responsible to a significant
degree for the increasing disparity in residential and school populations
between Wilmington and its suburbs in the two decades [after Brown]. ' 71
The evidence in these specific cases concerning the responsibility of gov-
ernment agencies for residential segregation was amply documented by
federal court rulings in other cases which the court did not accept for
review, 72 as well as by a large body of social science literature available to
the Court.7 3 And to make sure the Court could not overlook this enormous
body of data, the plaintiffs' lawyers in Columbus used a procedurally un-
orthodox technique and appended a "social science statement" to their
brief before the Supreme Court. Signed by thirty-seven prominent schol-
ars, it summarized repeated findings of governmental support, including
actions by school boards, of residential segregation and segregated
schools.7 4 Despite the findings by the lower courts and the experts' state-
ment in this case, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings of
unconstitutional segregation in Columbus and its ordering of a system-
wide remedy without at all addressing the responsibility of other govern-
mental agencies for residential segregation.
It should be pointed out that a variety of procedural obstacles influence
the degree to which lower court cases progress to the Supreme Court.
They might explain, to some extent, why the Court has not explicitly
addressed the question of government responsibility, apart from school
board action, for segregated schools. The procedural obstacles, about
which Dimond's book says very little, stem largely from the fact that only
school boards have been before the lower courts as defendants.
Although plaintiffs in several cases have been allowed to present evi-
dence as to the culpability of government agencies other than the school
boards for segregated systems, those agencies generally have not been for-
71. Evans, 393 F. Supp. at 438.
72. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
908 (1978) (opposition of city officials to black tenants in public housing project); Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Auth. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978) (refusal to allow construction of low-income housing accessible to minorities); Shannon v.
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (federal agency failure to
consider racial composition of area in selecting location for public housing).
73. See, e.g., UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUB-
LIC ScHoots, 20-25, 200-02 (1967); authorities canvassed in Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F.
Supp. 699, 735-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
74. This statement, with an explanation of how it was prepared, can be found in Orfield, School
Segregation and Residential Segregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 227-47 (W. Stephan & J.
Feagin eds. 1980). For a helpful review of the important literature on the relationship between hous-
ing and school segregation, see Note, Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Interdistrict School
Desegregation Remedies, 93 YALE L.J. 340 (1983); see also Selig, The Justice Department and Ra-
cially Exclusionary Municipal Practices: Creative Ventures in Fair Housing Act Enforcement, 17
U.C.D. L. RE-v. 445, 453 n.26 (1984).
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mally before the courts and thus have not had an opportunity to defend
against such charges. Since any court determination of liability with re-
spect to these absent parties would have violated due process,
7 5 it is not
surprising that the courts usually have made only generalized findings in
this connection, avoiding any formal determination of violation. This was
the case, for example, in both the Swann and Columbus cases.
16 Further-
more, efforts by school boards to bring in federal agencies by way of
third-party complaints for the most part have been rejected by lower
courts. In doing so, those courts have relied upon the fact that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) "normally requires that an impleaded party
be legally liable to the main defendant," a condition that school boards are
unlikely to satisfy in the school desegregation context."
The usual absence of government agencies other than school boards as
defendants in desegregation cases cannot, however, be attributed solely to
judicial resistance to their inclusion. Often plaintiffs' lawyers have made a
strategic decision not to include them. In most instances, as the long his-
tory of school desegregation litigation attests, school boards have been for-
midable opponents. Plaintiffs' lawyers understandably have felt that ad-
ding more defendants would make for even greater difficulties in
establishing liability and achieving a desegregation remedy.
What is more, the theory plaintiffs' lawyers were pressing in these
cases, one for which Dimond strongly argues, did not necessitate the join-
der of other governmental agencies. Plaintiffs contended that if the
state-acting through housing, redevelopment, licensing and other agen-
cies-was substantially responsible for the creation and maintenance of
segregated neighborhoods, then school boards, also creatures of the state,
could be held constitutionally responsible for intentionally establishing
and adhering to neighborhood assignment patterns that built upon that
75. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Indeed, in the Detroit
case, the court of appeals vacated and remanded for further hearings the trial court's ordering of a
metropolitan remedy because the affected suburban districts were "necessary parties" that had to be
joined and heard before such a remedy could be mandated. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215,
251-52 (6th Cir. 1973).
76. Supplemental Memorandum dated March 21, 1970, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. I, app. at 1228a-29a (1971); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229,
258-59 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
77. But see Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 752-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). There
the trial court required local, state and federal housing authorities to be joined in the litigation on the
grounds that they were "necessary parties" for the granting of effective relief pursuant to Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court later decided against entering any decree against
these and other non-school board defendants in view of their "cooperative spirit" in response to the
desegregation order and "the complexity of the matter." 383 F. Supp. at 775. On appeal the Second
Circuit rejected the Rule 19 rationale and concluded that the additional parties had been joined im-
properly. Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 40-41, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1975). Cf United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 594 F. Supp. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (third party complaint against
Department of Housing and Urban Development barred by sovereign immunity).
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segregation. School boards could then be ordered to desegregate their sys-
tems, even in the absence of other segregative acts. To quote one of Di-
mond's favorite metaphors, school boards should not be permitted to ig-
nore evidence of state segregative activity in their communities by simply
walking through a "magic door" into their administrative offices and se-
lecting neighborhood assignment plans irrespective of their segregative
consequences.
78
An additional obstacle to courts' addressing the responsibility of all gov-
ernment agencies for segregation stems from the fact that, though the pat-
tern has been uneven, the federal government has often played an impor-
tant role in pressing for school desegregation. Where this assistance has
been forthcoming, private plaintiffs have been reluctant to add other fed-
eral agencies, HUD for example, as defendants. To do so could alienate
at least part of an otherwise sympathetic administration and complicate
the role to be played by the Department of Justice as plaintiff in the same
litigation. A more promising alternative to joining a federal agency as a
party defendant under these circumstances, it was thought, would be to
try to achieve some voluntary assistance facilitated by the good offices of
the Department of Justice.
7 9
Dimond makes clear, moreover, in describing the strategies the plain-
tiffs' lawyers employed as the four cases moved to the Supreme Court,
that they themselves were reluctant to rely heavily upon theories of other
governmental agency responsibility for school segregation. As good liti-
gators and lawyers committed to protecting their clients' interests, they
saw winning as their primary objective. In the Supreme Court one does so
by making arguments that seem familiar to the Justices rather than by
suggesting that a favorable outcome requires the creation of new
doctrine.80
But Dimond properly rejects these procedural and strategic obstacles as
explanations for the Court's refusal, in all of the major school desegrega-
tion cases of the 1970's, to address directly claims of pervasive governmen-
tal responsibility for residential segregation and segregated schools."' A far
more reasonable explanation is that at least four Justices during that pe-
78. Pp. 239, 251.
79. For a description of this process during the St. Louis school desegregation litigation, see Dee
& Huggins, Models for Proving Liability of School and Housing Officials in School Desegregation
Cases, 23 URn. L. ANN. 111, 182-84 (1982).
80. P. 355.
81. Dimond points out that in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), for example, the State of
Michigan was before the courts and found liable for intentional segregative acts affecting the Detroit
school system. He argues that it is difficult under these circumstances to contend on the basis of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which speaks directly to states, that Michigan could not have been held
responsible for segregative acts of its other creatures and required to devise an appropriate remedy. P.
Ill.
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riod (Powell, Rehnquist, Burger and Stewart) had explicitly rejected such
a theory of responsibility. And, though one can only speculate, other Jus-
tices may have felt sufficiently tentative about either the merits of the is-
sue82 or the institutional competence of the judiciary to devise remedies for
such "compound" violations"' to deprive the Court of a working majority
in any of the previously discussed school desegregation cases.
Justice Powell made his views on this issue clear as early as Keyes,
where he observed that "geographical separation of the races . . . resulted
from purely natural and neutral non-state causes."
'84 Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist shared this vision sufficiently to join in Powell's
1976 separate opinion on remand in the Austin, Texas desegregation case,
where he stated that "[e]conomic pressures and voluntary preferences are
the primary determinants of residential patterns."85 Justice Stewart, in
Milliken, explicitly ignored the extensive evidence of governmentally fos-
tered residential segregation, both within and outside Detroit. Based upon
that selective reading of the record, he concluded that the predominantly
black schools in Detroit were "caused by unknown and perhaps unknow-
able factors such as in-migration, birth rates, economic changes or cumu-
lative acts of private racial fears." ' Justice Rehnquist made explicit in
Columbus/Dayton II his view, implicit in the Austin concurrence, that
residential segregation was a "melange of past happenings prompted by
82. Some members of the Court may be willing to concede that intentional government action
bears some responsibility for segregated residential patterns but resist the notion that it restricts indi-
vidual choice with respect to housing in the same way that segregative mandatory student assignment
plans restrict one's freedom to choose a particular school.
83. This is clearly not an idle concern. Indeed, the trial judge in Hart, 383 F. Supp. 699, who
had clearly committed himself initially to a comprehensive desegregation remedy, was forced to con-
clude that a decree running against non-school board officials would be inappropriate: "The decretal
tool is poorly designed for restructuring an entire community." 383 F. Supp. 769, 775 (E.D.N.Y.
1974). The Court of Appeals in Hart was even blunter with respect to the inappropriateness of the
trial judge's allowing the housing officials to be brought in:
It [the school board] succeeded initially in getting the District Judge to convert a narrow issue
involving a single junior high school with a capacity of about 1,000 students into what could
only become an issue so broad as to defy judicial competence, a matter which would require
coordinated legislative and executive action by three governments, federal, state and city, for a
solution.
512 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1975). For a comprehensive treatment of the Hart litigation, see Fishman,
The Limits of Remedial Power: Hart v. Community School Board 21, in Limrrs OF JuSTICE: THE
CouR'S' ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 115 (H. Kalodner & J. Fishman eds. 1978).
84. 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S 990, 994 (1976).
86. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). It is worth
noting, however, that Justice Stewart did leave open the possibility that proof of state housing viola-
tions of an interdistrict nature bearing on school segregation might warrant an interdistrict desegrega-
tion remedy. Id. at 755. His suggestion was in fact adopted by courts in both Wilmington, Evans v.
Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 438 (D. Del.) (three-judge court), affid per curiam, 423 U.S. 963
(1975), and Indianapolis, United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183, 189 (S.D.
Ind. 1978), affid in part & vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101, 1110-11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 838 (1980).
1760
HeinOnline -- 95 Yale L.J. 1760 1985-1986
School Desegregation in the 1980's
economic considerations, private discrimination, discriminatory school as-




One might ask why the Supreme Court's limited view on this issue
should be of any concern to plaintiffs' lawyers, apart from the Milliken
problem, given the bar's notable success in arguing for expanded school
board liability for segregated schools, North and South. Dimond's book
indirectly poses this question but, given its format, does not pretend to
provide any systematic response. Let me suggest a few concerns in this
area, the first of which relates to liability. The Supreme Court's silence on
whether evidence of governmental discrimination in housing is probative
or even relevant in school desegregation cases unduly restricts the way
that plaintiffs' lawyers present their cases, that trial courts evaluate evi-
dence, and that appellate courts review lower court findings. In the Day-
ton case, for example, the trial court refused to hear any such evidence.
To the extent that it considered the impact of residential segregation upon
the school system, the court's conclusion was that the board was free of
any constitutional responsibility for separate schools that might have re-
sulted from such segregation."8
To be sure, appellate courts in Dayton ultimately found sufficient
school board culpability to justify system-wide relief. But the Dayton ex-
perience suggests that in other lawsuits applying a similar view of housing
discrimination evidence, courts may find that highly segregated school sys-
tems do not result from school board action, or at least not in ways suffi-
cient to trigger Keyes or Columbus/Dayton presumptions.89 In such cases,
plaintiffs will be found entitled to only a limited remedy, if any at all.
And, given the limits the Supreme Court has imposed in recent years
upon appellate court review of factual findings by trial courts in racial
discrimination cases,90 such trial court determinations that school boards
are not liable may be effectively insulated from reversal. What this ap-
proach invites, in other words, is a determination that the uniform and
consistent adherence to a neighborhood assignment plan by one state insti-
tution, the school board, will deprive school desegregation plaintiffs of any
87. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 512 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974) (describing unreported trial court
rulings).
89. See, e.g., Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 1982); Brody-Jones v. Macchia-
rola, 503 F. Supp. 1185, 1247-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
90. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985) (review of trial court findings with
respect to discriminatory intent subject to Rule 52(a) "clearly erroneous" standard); Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (same).
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remedy. This will be the result, even where the school assignment plan
builds upon residential segregation fostered by other state entities, as well
as by federal agencies.
In addition, one cannot overlook, as Dimond's book seems to, the extent
to which liability rules announced by the Supreme Court in Swann, Keyes
and Columbus/Dayton II contribute to the impression that school boards
are being made scapegoats while other governmental agencies get off scot-
free for the school segregation to which they contributed. This may pro-
duce a situation where trial courts will be reluctant to find the requisite
facts to trigger the Swann-Keyes-ColumbuslDayton presumptions, partic-
ularly where the incumbent board has shown some contemporaneous will-
ingness to address the problem of continued segregation. Under such cir-
cumstances, courts might understandably view it as unjust to saddle school
boards with the entire desegregative burden, controlling precedent
notwithstanding.9'
The second set of concerns involves remedial considerations. Even
where school boards have been found liable for system-wide school segre-
gation and have been required to develop a comprehensive remedy, expe-
rience has taught that meaningful, long-term solutions are often beyond
the ability of even the most cooperative urban school board. Unless other
governmental agencies, either as formal parties or as voluntarily support-
ive forces, help devise and implement a remedy, prevailing patterns of
residential segregation will tend to undermine the ultimate success of a
school desegregation plan. One of the most unfortunate outgrowths of the
Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence has been that a host
of local, state and, most notably, federal agencies, have been able to avoid
almost all legal responsibility for sharing the financial and other burdens
of achieving desegregation. 2 Were the Supreme Court to establish that
other agencies bear liability for segregated schools, more financial and
human resources would be directed toward achieving desegregation in the
affected community. Dimond suggests (and I agree) that it would also
expand the focus of the national public debate over desegregation to in-
clude questions about the roles not only of school boards but of all impli-
cated government agencies in remedying residential segregation and the
segregated schools that result.93
91. See, e.g., Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 1982); Parents Ass'n of Andrew
Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1979).
92. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). See also the recent controversy between the
United States Government and the Chicago School Board over what level of federal funding the latter
should receive in carrying out a desegregation plan arrived at by way of a consent decree. United
States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. I1. 1983).
93. See Yudof, Nondiscrimination and Beyond: The Search for Principle in Supreme Court De-
segregation Decisions, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 97, 115 (W. Stephan & J. Feagin eds. 1980)
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Under Supreme Court doctrine, however, only school boards have a
constitutional responsibility for remedying segregation, and then only to
the extent that they eliminate narrowly defined dual systems.9 Conse-
quently, even when courts find that system-wide segregation exists and
then order a comprehensive remedy, other governmental agencies may act
in ways that thwart the school board's implementation of the plan. And
even when there are no current actions undermining school boards' plans,
the continuing effects of other agencies' earlier practices in promoting and
maintaining residential segregation may have a similar result. Yet the Su-
preme Court directs lower courts to look only at whether the school board
has discharged its responsibility. If the board has, and the schools remain
largely segregated, plaintiffs have no further recourse. This scenario has
already taken place in several communities, and is now being played out
in a number of proceedings in which school boards deny any further duty
to desegregate.
9 5
Finally, the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence has
produced unnecessary confusion as to the status of voluntary desegregation
efforts. In Swann and its companion cases, the Supreme Court suggested
that the Constitution allows school boards to adopt "racial balance" stu-
dent assignment plans for educational reasons.9 8 More recently, in the Se-
attle case,9 7 the Court upheld a voluntary plan in the face of a state law
prohibiting such action. The Court found that the state prohibition was
an unconstitutional racial classification that, in addition, impermissibly in-
fringed upon the important principle, extolled in Milliken, of local control
of public schools. Yet the Court appeared to go out of its way to reserve
the question of whether school boards could, consistent with the Four-
teenth Amendment, utilize racial criteria in student assignment in the ab-
sence of a proven constitutional violation.98 The record in Seattle was si-
lent on this point. Were the Court to take the broader view of
governmental responsibility for school desegregation that is being urged
(discussion of the impact of Supreme Court decisions upon the character of public debate over school
desegregation and the costs to that process of the Court's lack of candor); Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PoB. AFFs. 107, 145 (1976) (discussing ethical significance of various
characterizations of discrimination).
94. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1973); Pasadena City Bd.
of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
95. See, e.g., Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1983) (district unitary);
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 609 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Colo. 1985) (district nonuni-
tary); Riddick v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, No. 84-1815, slip. op. (4th Cir. 1986) (district uni-
tary); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (district unitary). A recent
United States Department of Justice press release reports that 117 school districts have been declared
"fully desegregated" and 47 have obtained court orders relieving them of any further duty to desegre-
gate. Dep't of Justice, Press Release (Feb. 18, 1986).
96. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
97. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
98. 458 U.S. at 472 n.15.
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here, school boards would not be precluded from remedying voluntarily
the segregative effects of other proven government agency action, irrespec-
tive of any liability on their part.
The Court's restricted view of the sources of school segregation also was
responsible for the unfortunate result in Crawford v. Los Angeles Board
of Education.9 In that case, California courts had ordered the desegrega-
tion of a Los Angeles school based upon the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia's determination that California's state constitution required such steps,
irrespective of whether the school board was responsible for the segrega-
tion. Subsequently, California voters ratified a proposition that limited
court authority to order desegregation only to situations where the Four-
teenth Amendment would so require. As a result, court-ordered desegre-
gation of Los Angeles was halted, because the record reflected only a
"passive maintenance by the Board of a neighborhood school system in the
face of widespread residential racial imbalance . . . ."'0 "A school
board," said the California appellate court, "has no duty under the Four-
teenth Amendment to meet and overcome the effect of population
movements."' 1
The Supreme Court viewed the restricting proposition not as an imper-
missible racial classification like that in Seattle, but rather as a decision by
the California electorate against continuing "to do more" than the United
States Constitution requires. The Crawford decision further reinforces the
concept of a state as a fragmented, rather than a unitary, institution.
Again, the state remains free to avoid responsibility for segregated schools.
Courts are directed to focus solely upon the school board's actions, while
ignoring the many ways in which other state (and federal) agencies have
promoted and maintained the conditions that allow such segregation to
persist.1 o2
VI.
Recent developments since the publication of Beyond Busing suggest,
however, that the Supreme Court soon may be faced squarely with the
question it has thus far avoided. The Yonkers, New York, school desegre-
gation lawsuit decided last November is a case in point. In December
1980, the United States Department of Justice brought a desegregation
suit against the City of Yonkers, a community in Westchester County only
99. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
100. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 645, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 503 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981).
101. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 646, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
102. In Crawford, the Court also made clear that it was not passing on the constitutionality of
California's earlier desegregation standard. 458 U.S. at 535 n.11.
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a few miles north of New York City. The complaint named as defendants
the City of Yonkers, the Yonkers Community Development Agency
(CDA), and the Yonkers Board of Education, and it alleged that these
agencies had, in administering Yonkers' school system and public housing
programs, violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the Fourteenth Amendment. More spe-
cifically, the Department of Justice alleged that the City of Yonkers, act-
ing with and through CDA and its school board, had implemented a pol-
icy of racially motivated discrimination that produced unlawful racial
segregation in the public schools and in housing patterns throughout
Yonkers.
103
In March 1981, the Yonkers Branch of the NAACP, along with a
black resident of Yonkers, moved to intervene. The individual black plain-
tiff-intervenor sought to represent a class of "all black residents of Yon-
kers who are currently residents of, or eligible to reside in, publicly as-
sisted housing in Yonkers, or who are parents of students currently
attending public school in Yonkers." 1  After receiving leave to intervene
and certification as a class action, the plaintiff-intervenors amended their
complaint to add a claim against the United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD).105 This claim was settled through a
consent decree prior to trial.106
After a lengthy trial, the federal district judge issued an opinion finding
defendants liable on both school and housing segregation claims as
charged by the Department of Justice. The court found that the extreme
concentration of subsidized housing in one heavily-minority area of the
city was the result of a more than thirty-year pattern of racially discrimi-
natory conduct by city officials. The court concluded that the city followed
this course in response to white constituent pressures to select or support
only sites that would preserve existing patterns of racial segregation and
to reject or oppose sites that would have desegregative effects. It was clear,
said the court, that "but for" the "chronic and pervasive influence" of
race, a "significantly different" configuration of subsidized housing would
have arisen.
1 0 7
103. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
104. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., No. 80 Civ. 6761 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1985).
105. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 594 F. Supp. 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
106. Under that consent decree, HUD agreed to make available to the City of Yonkers funding
for 200 units of two bedroom or larger housing to be located east of the Saw Mill River Parkway, a
predominantly white area. Additionally, it agreed to make available 175 family certificates to be used
east of the Parkway. With these certificates, families can obtain housing at prevailing rates and re-
ceive government subsidies to defray a significant portion of the cost. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., No. 80 Civ. 6761 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1984) (order approving consent decree).
107. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). For an
excellent recent survey of the segregated nature of public housing in the United States, see Flourney
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The court concluded, moreover, that although the record demonstrated
no consistent pattern of segregative school openings or closings or racial
gerrymandering of attendance lines that had system-wide segregative im-
pact, individual instances of such segregative practices had occurred. Fur-
thermore, said the court, the Board had engaged in four types of unlawful
discriminatory acts and omissions, all with system-wide impact, that had
perpetuated both racial segregation in public schools and discriminatory
attitudes in the Yonkers community. Two of these practices, the racial
assignment of faculty and administrative staff, and that of secondary
school students, fit into the mold of many other Northern school cases.
The remaining two violations, discriminatory practices in vocational and
special education, have not been commonly found, though there is evi-
dence to suggest that similar patterns exist elsewhere.1 08 Finally, the court
found that the city's housing practices, the mayoral appointment of school
board members, and other city involvement in school affairs were more
than adequate evidence of the city's intentional perpetuation and exacer-
bation of racial segregation in Yonkers' public schools.
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law alone suffice to
justify labelling the Yonkers decision as "unprecedented." But what truly
distinguishes it from prior school desegregation cases in the federal court
system is that it squarely adopts the theory of "state-action" urged upon
the Supreme Court by Justice Douglas thirteen years ago in Keyes.109 To
quote the trial judge in Yonkers:
It is indisputable that a hypothetical single state agency which con-
trols the operation of, and engages in the racial segregation of, both
housing and schools-by confining for racial reasons the city's subsi-
& Rodriguez, Separate and Unequal, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 10-17, 1985.
108. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 5, at 113-33.
109. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 214 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Admittedly, the trial court in Hart did likewise. That decision is of limited precedential
value, however, because the court in Hart based liability of governmental agencies upon a finding of
"natural and foreseeable consequences," rather than "discriminatory intent." 383 F. Supp. 699. The
former test has been rejected as inappropriate to determine the presence of a constitutional violation.
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979). Plaintiffs in Bell v. Board of Educ.
also named the City of Akron, the city housing authority, and the Ohio Real Estate Commission
president as defendants, along with the school board. 491 F. Supp. 916, 917 (N.D. Ohio 1980). The
complaint contained no federal Title VIII (Fair Housing Act) claims. The trial court found against
the plaintiffs on their constitutional housing discrimination claims. The court of appeals affirmed on
grounds of res judicata, finding that an earlier lawsuit had determined that the school system was not
unconstitutionally segregated. 683 F.2d 963, 965-67 (6th Cir. 1982). Of course, the court in Yonkers
had before it a rather focused claim of non-school board governmental discrimination, namely the
locating of public housing to maintain residential segregation. It did not have to resolve, therefore,
broader claims like those raised in earlier cases of state action affecting choice in the private housing
market. These claims, relating to enforcement of restrictive covenants; discrimination in appraisal,
financing, and licensing; and segregative land use practices, present far more difficult questions, going
to both liability and remedy, than those raised in Yonkers.
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dized housing to one section of the city, while simultaneously adher-
ing to a neighborhood school policy of student assignment-can be
held liable for such conduct. It is inconceivable that state action may
be fractionalized such that two state agencies could be permitted to
collectively engage in precisely the same conduct, yet avoid legal ac-
countability for the identical result."'
This view of state action allowed the court not only to find the city
responsible for school segregation based in large part upon its segregative
housing practices, but also to impose liability upon the school board for
its failure to take desegregative action to overcome the effects of the city's
segregative housing practices, an approach that has been generally es-
chewed by the courts. What the Yonkers court said, however, is that
where the neighborhoods were intentionally segregated by the action of
one state agency (in this case, the city), another state agency (the school
board) cannot sit idly by, utilizing a neighborhood assignment plan that
reproduces that residential segregation in the schools. And where this has
occurred, the board's consistent refusal to take desegregative actions does
constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Yonkers case provided the court with the proper parties and the
occasion, free of the procedural complications normally experienced in
school desegregation lawsuits, to consider fully what forces propelled by
which state actors create and perpetuate segregated schools. Only review
by higher courts will tell us whether the trial judge was correct in the
Yonkers case. Given the court's careful and extensive treatment of the fac-
tual record there is strong reason to believe that its determinations will
withstand appellate scrutiny. This is not to say that the court was necessa-
rily correct in the answers it gave as to the culpability of city, housing,
and school officials. Nor does it suggest that courts in other school deseg-
regation cases will find the same mix and range of segregative governmen-
tal action."' But it is to emphasize that the court asked the right ques-
tions, questions that properly deserve to be addressed in any urban school
desegregation case.
The case may not be appealed." 2 One is tempted, given the need for
candor in the Supreme Court on these issues, to hope that an appeal is
taken. On the other hand, common law tradition aside, a settlement of the
110. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., No. 80 Civ. 6761 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1985).
111. Indeed, the trial court in Bell v. Board of Educ. concluded that there were no housing
violations in that case. 491 F. Supp. at 942-48.
112. Though the situation appears somewhat unsettled at this point, recent news reports indicated
that the defendants have decided to appeal the desegregation order. See Feron, Yonkers Schools Defy
City Council, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1986, at A32, col. 1; Yonkers Between justice and Contempt,
N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at A34, col. 1; School Board Plans Appeal in Yonkers Segregation Case,
N.Y. Times, June 29, 1986, at 31, col. 2.
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Yonkers case would offer, in my estimation, a rare opportunity for a com-
munity and its citizens, working with the federal government and private
plaintiffs, to develop remedies that have a genuine chance of producing
successful and stable desegregation. In particular, it would present a chal-
lenge to those who claim support for school desegregation but who oppose
busing to devise housing remedies that produce integrated neighborhoods
serving neighborhood schools.'1
This is clearly what Dimond would like as well. In some quarters,
there may be a tendency to regard plaintiffs' lawyers in school desegrega-
tion cases as zealots committed to "massive cross-town busing to achieve
racial balance" irrespective of the attendant costs. However, if Dimond is
representative of plaintiffs' lawyers in these cases, and I think he is, such
charges could not be further from the mark. His book is an invitation to a
dialogue, not a debate, over school desegregation. It does not claim to have
all the answers, but only to ask questions that our society would rather
ignore.
If the Yonkers case is appealed, the Second Circuit will have to address
the conception of state action that is at the heart of the trial court's opin-
ion. And should this case ultimately reach the Supreme Court, I would
hope that the Court would recognize, however it decides the merits of the
Yonkers school situation, that black and Hispanic children locked in seg-
regated schools throughout the Nation deserve a better answer than that
they have no claim whenever school boards simply incorporate into their
student assignment plans our country's equally segregated residential pat-
terns. Brown deserves a better legacy than what Dimond calls "our con-
temporary, albeit substantially sanitized, form of apartheid.
1 1 4
Is there a philosopher in the house?
113. This Review is not the occasion for a comprehensive discussion of school desegregation reme-
dies and the ways that findings of liability against governmental agencies other than school boards
might affect the remedial process. I want to make dear, however, that I do not mean to minimize the
complexity of remedial questions in this field, which has been treated comprehensively of late in
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983), and Shane, School Desegregation Rem-
edies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1041 (1984), among other works.
Presumably the model I suggest presents even greater challenges. Even where a court has found non-
school board governmental agencies liable for producing segregated neighborhoods, it has several re-
medial options. It can order a remedy that involves just the schools; it can direct its efforts to desegre-
gating housing; or it can choose a combination of both. The major problem will be, undoubtedly, one
of devising appropriate criteria to guide a court's selection from among these alternatives. A plan
supported, in terms of financial as well as human resources, by several government agencies may,
however, produce substantially less disruption than a plan for which a school board is solely responsi-
ble. Moreover, I am unwilling to presume that, in the event defendants default, federal courts will be
unequal to the task of devising plans that represent a "nice adjustment and reconciliation between the
public interest and private needs." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
114. P. 402.
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